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BY DAVID L. CALLIES
nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just
compensation.
-First Amendment
Breaking a 65-year silence, the
U.S. Supreme Court decided three
cases this term construing the bal-
ance between private property rights
and local land-use regulation under
the Fifth Amendment.
The first, Keystone Bituminous
Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,
107 S.Ct. 1232 (1987), deals solely with
the "taking" issue and the heavy bur-
den placed on a landowner who
claims that a land-use regulation
works an unconstitutional taking of
property. The second, First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County ofLosAngeles, 107 S.Ct. 2378
(1987), decided on very narrow
grounds, skips over the "taking" is-
sue altogether, but finds compensa-
tion potentially available for
temporary regulatory takings in
which all use of the land is prevented
by governmental regulation.
The third, Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n., No. 86-133 (June
26, 1987), upheld fees, exactions and
dedications levied by local govern-
ment as conditions on land develop-
ment, provided there was an
"essential" or rational nexus be-
tween the condition and the devel
opment-caused problem which the
condition addressed. In context, these
three decisions represent a wa-
tershed in property rights under land-
development regulations.
BACKGROUND
Since the U.S. Supreme Court's
famous decision in Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922),
federal and state courts have wres-
tled with the application of the Fifth
Amendment to laws that restrict the
use of land. In Pennsylvania Coal,
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In Pennsylvania, half of coal beneath protected structures must be kept in
place to provide support and cannot be mined.
Justice Holmes suggested that a reg-
ulation, if it goes too far, could
amount to a taking.
Over the following half-century,
when the Court heard no land-use
cases of substance, state courts whit
tled away much of the decision's
chilling effect on land-use regulation
and concentrated on refining the reg-
ulation of land use approved by the
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Corp., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
However, beginning in 1978 the Court
accepted a series of cases addressing
the key issues raised in Pennsylva-
nia Coal: (1) When has a regulation
gone "too far"? and (2) Is compen-
sation an appropriate remedy, once
the "too far" has been reached?
Until this past term the Court
consistently put off resolving either
issue, erecting a formidable array of
procedural and ripeness barriers to
reaching the merits either of the tak-
ing issue or the compensation issue.
In Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978), the Court decided that there
was no "bright line" pointing the way
toward a regulatory taking determi-
nation, and the process was entirely
ad hoc. The test of Pennsylvania
Coal weighed the public health,
safety and welfare goals served
against the degree of property value
diminution.
In Williamson Co. Regional
Plan. Comm'n. v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Court refused
to reach the taking or compensation
issues because the landowner failed
to take advantage of state inverse
condemnation procedures or to seek
and be denied enough local land-use
permits and permissions so as to per-
mit an accurate assessment of how
far local land-use regulations had de-
valued the property. And in Mc-
Donald, Sommer & Frates v. County
of Yolo, 106 S.Ct. 2561 (1986), the
Court characterized Holmes' "regu-
latory taking" language as a "notion"
and affirmed that without a 'final
and authoritative determination by
local government on the application
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property" it could not reach either the
taking or compensation issues.
But in 1987, the Court decided it
finally had three cases in which it




Ass'n. v. DeBenedictis makes clear
the extent to which the Court is re-
thinking Pennsylvania Coal. The
majority relegates its precedential
value to regulatory taking situations
in which property values have been
reduced virtually to nothing or in
which legitimate investment-backed
expectations have been wholly frus-
trated by exercises of the police
power. Even then, the state may act
to protect public health, the environ-
ment and "local fiscal policy."
Since 1966, Pennsylvania's Bi-
tuminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act has prohibited
mining that causes subsidence dam-
age to public buildings, homes and
cemeteries. The State Department of
Environmental Resources requires
that 50 percent of the coal beneath
such protected structures be kept in
place in order to provide that sup-
port. Keystone Bituminous Coal As-
sociation alleged that the act takes
their (private) property without
compensation, in violation of the
Fifth and 14th Amendments.
First, the Court distinguished
Pennsylvania Coal. In that case, said
the Court, Holmes was dealing with
a 1921 statute designed to protect pri-
vate property (a single home). The
damage complained of was "not com-
mon or public," so could not be sus-
tained as an exercise of the police
power.
The Court then characterized
Holmes' discussion of the general va-
lidity of the Act as an "advisory opin-
ion." But here, said the Court, the
1966 Subsidence Act is directed at
what Pennsylvania perceives to be a
significant threat to common wel-
fare, not the protection of a single
private house.
Second, in acting to protect the
public interest in health, the environ-
ment and the fiscal integrity of the
area, the state is exercising its police
power to abate activity akin to a
nuisance.
The Court then cited Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), Ply-
52 ABA JOURNAL ,[NOVEMBER 1, 1987
Steve Dyves
Nollan beachfront home
mouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232
U.S. 531 (1914), and Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928), as proof
that the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly upheld regulations that destroy
or adversely affect real property in-
terests if the state's interest in the
regulation was, as here, strong
enough. Therefore, the Court said,
Pennsylvania Coal was consistent
with these cases.
Third, and most important, the
Court characterized the association's
deprivation of property rights as not
sufficiently significant to satisfy the
"heavy burden placed upon one al-
leging a regulatory taking." The
plaintiffs claimed that the Subsid-
ence Act forced them to leave 27 mil-
lion tons of coal in place as support.
Because they owned it but could not
mine it, they claimed this resulted in
an unconstitutional taking of private
property. The Court rejected the
claim on several grounds.
The coal in place does not rep-
resent a separate segment of prop
erty for takings law purposes, the
Court said. It refused to concentrate
on these separate pillars of coal as
distinct property rights, observing
that it has consistently held that
when an owner has a full bundle of
rights, the destruction of one strand
is not a taking. As the Court observed
in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York, takings juris-
prudence does not divide a single
parcel into discrete segments and at-
tempt to determine whether rights in
a particular segment have been en-
tirely abrogated.
The record indicated that only 75
percent of plaintiffs' underground
coal could be mined profitably. The
Court found that the plaintiffs had
not shown that their reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations had
been materially affected by the duty
to retain the small percentage needed
to support the structures protected by
the act.
And even though Pennsylvania
law apparently regards the support
estate as a separate interest in land
(and if so construed, the taking of
property rights certainly appears to
be greater) the Supreme Court is not
bound by that construction: "Our
takings jurisprudence forecloses re-
liance on such legalistic distinctions
within a bundle of property rights."
In any event, the support estate
only has value if viewed in conjunc-
tion with the rest of the estate. There
was no indication that the plaintiffs
could not mine profitably even if the
Subsidence Act prevented them from
destroying or damaging surface
structures.
Even accepting the association's
theory that the support estate should
be viewed separately, the Court
would reject the takings claim be-
cause it did not show what percent-
age of the support estate had been
affected by the act. The Court found
the coal companies retained far more
support estate than they were re-
quired to leave in place under the
Subsidence Act.
Under Keystone, then, in order
to successfully challenge a land-use
regulation on its face as a regulatory
taking, a landowner must show (1) it
is not merely difficult, but impossible
to make a profit on the land as re-
stricted, and (2) the regulation does
not serve a legitimate, general and
substantial public interest in the
health, environment and fiscal integ-
rity of the area.
In First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, the church sued the county
over an interim ordinance that pro-
hibited most development on its
property. Flooding had destroyed the
church's summer camp, and the
county had temporarily designated
the property, located along a creek,
as a flood protection area. The Cali-
fornia courts held that the remedies
available for deprivation of use of
land by ordinance were declaratory
relief or mandamus. The church
sought only damages.
THE COMPENSATION ISSUE
The U.S. Supreme Court re-
versed. For the first time it held that
compensation may be an appropriate
remedy for total regulatory takings.
But that's all it held: "We merely hold
that where the government's activi-
ties have already worked a taking of
all property, no subsequent action by
the government can relieve it of the
duty to provide compensation for the
period during which the taking was
effective." (Emphasis added.)
But that's enough to raise the de
cision to the status of landmark. The
Court had never before decided that
money was a potential landowner
remedy when government regula-
tions severely restrict private land
use.
It is possible that the policy im-
plications of the decision are as "ob-
vious" and "far reaching" as the
dissenting justices claim: "Cautious
local officials and land-use planners
may avoid taking any action that
might later be challenged and thus
give rise to a damage action. Much
more important regulation will never
be enacted, even perhaps in the
health and safety area."
But that is not what the Court
held. The Court did not grant money
damages to anyone. It sent the case
back to California simply because it
interpreted the California courts to
have forbidden money damages for
government regulations that tempo-
rarily deny an owner all use of its
property.
The Court did not say that flood-
plain controls-or any other land-use
controls take property.Therefore,
this decision has no value in deter-
mining what is or is not a regulatory
taking of property. It says only if an
ordinance temporarily denies all use
to a landowner-that is, assuming the
difficult ripeness and balancing bar-
riers to proving a regulatory taking
have been surmounted and no use
is left (a stricter standard than Key-
stone's "all economic use," note) a
state court may not forbid compen-
sation as a remedy.
The Court did not say that, if
floodplain controls do take property,
the owner is entitled to money dam-
ages: "We have no occasion to decide
... whether the county might avoid the
conclusion that a compensable tak-
ing had occurred by establishing that
the denial of all use was insulated as
part of the state's authority to enact
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safety regulations."
In other words, a court could still
decide that even the most grievous
effects on private property values are
justifiable if the public need for the
regulation is sufficiently dire, as the
Court held in Keystone.
What are the implications for
state and local government, now that
state courts may not forbid compen-
sation as a remedy for temporary reg-
ulatory deprivation of all private land
use?
If a state or local government
should zone land "park" and forbid
all land use, then if (as is likely) a
court should find the state or county
regulation results in an unconstitu-
tional taking, damages are available
for the period from the application of
the regulation to the property to the
date of the court decision.
The finding of a regulatory tak-
ing is likely because, under Key-
stone, the Court sets great store by
the health, environmental and safety
need for the regulation (and there is
little of any of the above in the case
of a park) and the extent of the eco-
nomic use left, which, presumably,
would be none in the case of a park.
Virtually all other land-use or-
dinances, plans and permit decisions
are left intact by the First Lutheran
decision, as the Court makes clear.
"We limit our holding to the facts
presented [Here we must assume that
the Los Angeles County ordinances
have denied appellant all use of its
property for a considerable period of
years, and we hold that invalidation
of the ordinance without payment of
fair value for the use of the property
during this period of time would be a
constitutionally insufficient remedy]
and of course do not deal with the
quite different questions that would
arise in the case of normal delays in
obtaining building permits, change in
zoning ordinances, variances and the
like which are not before us."
The U.S. Supreme Court appears
to have given its collective blessing
to impact fees, dedications, exactions
and other conditions on land devel-
opment in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission. Typically, an
impact fee, dedication or exaction is
a condition imposed on a develop-
ment to provide for public facilities,
the need for which is generated by
that development.
CONDITIONS ON DEVELOPMENT
If there is sufficient authority to
impose a condition, courts commonly
address the relationship between the
development upon which the condi-
tion was placed and the purpose for
which the condition was imposed.
Generally, courts have'used three ap-
proaches to weigh the reasonable-
ness of this relationship:
The "rational nexus" test, as
applied in Florida and the majority
of jurisdictions. This test has two
parts. First, the particular develop-
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ment must create a "need," to which
the value of the exaction, dedication
or fee bears some roughly propor-
tionate relationship. Second, the lo-
cal government must demonstrate
that the exaction, dedication or fee
will be used for the purpose levied.
The more restrictive "specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable" test,
used, for example, in Rhode Island
and Illinois. The need for the exac-
tion, dedication or fee must be
"uniquely and specifically attribut-
able to a particular developer or de-
velopment, and no other factor."
The least restrictive-indeed
generous "reasonable relationship"
test, applied mainly by the California
courts, who will generally uphold ex-
actions, dedications and fees as a con
dition of land-use approval where: (1)
the municipality is acting within its
police power; (2) the conditions have
a reasonable relation to the public
welfare; and (3) the municipality does
not act in an arbitrary manner.
Decided on the last day of the
Court's 1986 term, Nollan deals os-
tensibly with beach access. The Cal-
ifornia Coastal Commission required
that landowners dedicate to the pub-
lic, for lateral beach access, much of
their backyard before receiving a
permit to rebuild a beach house into
a permanent residence. The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal had held this was
a valid exercise of the commission's
police power under its statutory duty
to protect the California coast.
The Supreme Court reversed.
Noting that the taking of such an ac-
cess over private property by itself
would require compensation, the
Court examined whether the same
requirement, imposed under the po-
lice or regulatory power of the com-
mission rather than under its powers
of eminent domain, would modify the
"just compensation" requirement.
The direct holding of the Court
was that in this case it did not and
that compensation was required. The
rationale of the Court is critical.
The Court observed that land-use
regulations do not affect takings if
they substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests and do not deny
an owner the economically viable use
of his land. Assuming that legitimate
state interests include, in the com-
mission's words, protecting public
views of the beach and assisting the
public in overcoming the psycholog-
ical barrier to the beach created by
overdevelopment, the Court could not
accept the commission's position that
there was a nexus between these in-
terests and the condition attached to
Nollan's beach house redevelopment.
"It is quite impossible," the Court
said, "to understand how a require-
ment that people already on the pub-
lic beaches be able to walk across the
Nollans' property reduces any obsta-
cles to viewing the beach created by
the new house. It is also impossible
to understand how it lowers any 'psy-
chological barrier' to using the public
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beaches, or how it helps to remedy
any additional congestion on them
caused by construction of the Nol-
lans' new house. We therefore find
that the Commission's imposition of
the permit condition cannot be
treated as an exercise of its land use
power for any of these purposes."
However, said the Court, it is an
altogether different matter if there is
an "essential nexus" between the
condition (impact fee, dedication, or
exaction) and what the landowner
proposes to do with the property.
"Thus, if the Commission at-
tached to the permit some condition
that would have protected the pub-
lic's ability to see the beach notwith-
standing the construction of the new
house-for example, a height limi-
tation, a width restriction, or a ban
on fences-so long as the Commis-
sion could have exercised its police
power (as we assumed it could) to
forbid construction of the house al-
together, imposition of the condition
would also be constitutional. More-
over (and here we come closer to the
facts of the present case), the condi-
tion would be constitutional even if
it consisted of the requirement that
the Nollans provide a viewing spot on
their property for passersby with
whose sighting of the ocean their new
house would interfere.
"The evident constitutional pro-
priety disappears, however, if the
condition substituted for the prohi-
bition utterly fails to further the end
advanced as the justification for the
prohibition. ... The lack of nexus be-
tween the condition and the original
purpose of the building restriction
converts that purpose into something
other than what it was. The purpose
becomes, quite simply, the obtaining
of an easement to serve some valid
governmental purpose, but without
payment of compensation. Whatever
may be the outer limits of 'legitimate
state interests' in the takings and land
use context, this is not one of them."
In short, the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have adopted the Florida
"rational nexus" test concerning ex-
actions, dedications and impact fees
rather than the broader "reasonable
relationship" California rule. The de-
cision also suggests that naked "link-
age" programs that seek to impose
fees, dedications and conditions on
development merely because the de-
veloper needs a permit and the pub-
lic sector needs an unrelated public
project are probably also illegal.
Moreover, more "traditional"
dedication and exaction require-
ments long presumed legal, such as
public roads and parks inside a pro-
posed development, may have to pass
scrutiny under the Court's "essential
nexus" test, and some may fail. There
clearly will need to be a rational
nexus between all of what is exacted
from a landowner as a condition
precedent to development and the
public need for which the condition
is attached or the fee levied. N
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